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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R O B E R T B. N I X 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 1 
S A M U E L W. S M I T H , Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
< Case No 
13855 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Peter F . Leary presiding, deny-
ing the appellant's release on a writ of habeas corpus. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The appellant's petition for release was denied by 
the Honorable Peter F . Leary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the denial of his peti-
tion for habeas corpus reversed. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On the 20th day of May, 1970, the appellant 
entered a plea of guilty in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, to the crime 
of issuing a check against insufficient funds. He was 
sentenced to serve a six month term and make restitu-
tio. The appellant had already served three months 
and th Honorable Ronald O. Hyde gave him credit 
for time served and an extra three months credit for 
good behavior and placed the appellant on probation. 
On the 4th day of September, 1970, the appellant 
requested and was granted permission to go to the 
State of Illinois. Shortly thereafter, on December 21, 
1970, a bench warrant was issued for probation viola-
tion and the appellant was arrested in Illinois for being 
a fugitive from justice. After spending 30 days in the 
Madsen County jail as a fugitive from justice, and as 
no action was taken, the appellant was discharged from 
custody. Subsequent to the dismissal of the fugitive 
complaint in the State of Illinois, appellant was placed 
in the custody of the State of Illinois' Department of 
Mental Health on an involuntary commitment. On 
the following 7th day of May, 1971, the appellant was 
released from the Illinois State Hospital and, without 
being taken before a committing magistrate in the State 
of Illinois and without legal extradition proceedings or 
a waiver thereof, was transferred and transported back 
to the State of Utah based on a bench warrant. After 
being returned to the State of Utah appellant was 
2 
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brought before the court and, upon a plea of guilty for 
probation violation and without being represented by 
counsel, was sentenced to serve not less than five years 
in the Utah State Prison for probation violation. 
A writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
requested that the appellant be released based on his 
illegal restraint and violation of his constitutional rights. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E A P P E L L A N T W A S D E N I E D BASIC 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L R I G H T S IN T H A T T H E 
T E R M S OF T H E " I N T E R S T A T E COMPACT 
FOR P A R O L E E S A N D P R O B A T I O N E R S " 
W E R E NOT C O M P L I E D W I T H . 
The appellant submits that to have a proper inter-
state rendition of a probationer or parolee that a formal 
hearing prior to the taking of the probationer or parolee 
is a constitutional as well as a state requirement. 
The language of the "Interstate Compact": prior 
to 1973 seems to direct that in order to retrieve a vio-
lator the sending state need merely issue a warrant 
establishing the "authority of the officer and identity 
of the officer and identity of the person retaken/' then 
send its own officer to return the parolee or probationer. 
Under this theory the officer is required only to 
3 
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take the probationer or parolee in to custody, then re-
turn him to the original state. 
Appellant submits that such procedure is in conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States, Article IV, 
Section 2, Clause 2, which provides: 
^ A person charged in any State with Treason, 
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from 
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on 
demand of the Executive Authority of the State 
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be re-
moved to the State having Jurisdiction of the 
crime. 
Based upon this section of the Constitution, Con-
gress was given full authority over interstate rendition 
of fugitives and passed the Federal Extradition Acts, 
18 USC §§1831 et seq (1948), 28 USC § 2253 (1951), 
which provide comprehensive extradition procedures, in-
cluding the due process safeguard of a formal hearing, 
18 USC §§ 3189, 3190 (1948). 
The State has attempted to waive the rights of 
the Appellant as outlined by the Federal Constitution 
and federal statutes supplemental thereto. This waiver 
is allegedly sanctioned by section 77-62-39 (c), Utah 
Code Annotated, which provides : 
That duly accredited officers of a sending state 
may at all times enter a receiving state and there 
apprehend and retake any person on probation 
or parole from such sending state. For that pur-
4 
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pose no formalities will be required other than 
establishing the authority of the officer and the 
identity of the person to be retaken. All legal re-
quirements to obtain extradition of fugitives 
from justice are expressly waived on the part of 
states party hereto as to such persons. 
If this statute is interpreted as an attempt by the State 
to prospectively waive the Consitutionally guaranteed 
right to due process of law, such alleged waiver must 
be void and of no effect. 
Rights guaranteed to an individual may only be 
waived by the individual, and then only if such waiver 
is a knowing, intelligent, and informed waiver, John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 
1461. 
Appellant submits that a parolee or probationer is 
a fugitive from justice and is entitled to the compre-
hensive procedure outlined by the extradition statutes, 
both federal and state. The case law leaves no doubt that 
to have one's parole or probation revoked or have vio-
lated the terms of their parole or probation are fugitives 
from justice. The situation is unchanged even if the 
parolee or probationer has been given authorization by 
supervising authorities to go into another state, Brewer 
v. Goff, 138 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1943); Ross v. Becker, 
382 111. 404, 47 N.E.2d 475 (1943); Redd v. Colpoys, 
99 F.2d 396 (CADC 1938). Clearly, appellant was 
entitled to a formal hearing and formal procedures be-
fore being returned from the state of Illinois to the state 
5 
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of Utah. The states cannot waive the article of the 
United States Constitution which was designed for in-
terstate retaking and/or rendition of persons accused 
of crimes, or violation of probation or parole. 
I t is basic knowledge that there are areas where 
federal law implementing Constitutional guarantees is 
applicable to the states and is the supreme law of the 
land. Extradition is one of those areas, Pierce v. Creecy, 
210 U.S. 387, 401 (1908); McCline v. Meyeringo, 75 
F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934). In Day v. Keim, 2 F.2d 966 
(4th Cir. 1924), the court stated, "The intention of the 
framers of Article IV of the Constitution was to em-
brace fully the subject of the rendition between states 
of fugitives from justice, and to confer authority upon 
Congress to deal with that subject." 
Further, the Alabama Supreme Court in State v. 
Partish, 242 Ala. 7, 5 So.2d 828 (1941), in dealing with 
interstate rendition, stated: ". . . any statutes bearing on 
this subject must complement or enforce this constitu-
tional provision and statute, and any inconsistency 
therewith is obviously void." 
There is no question that the Interstate Compact 
as applied to Appellant is inconsistent, and has at-
tempted to create law which superscedes federal law, 
in attempting to eliminate by prospective waiver Ap-
pellant's Constitutionally guaranteed right to formal 
hearing and rendition procedures. 
6 
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The Utah State Legislature, as well as the Illinois 
State Legislature, both in 1973, realized that the Con-
stitution and the rights of parolees and probationers 
were being violated when they passed an amendment to 
the Interstate Compact, which amendment required 
that the receiving state hold a formal hearing to deter-
mine whether a probationer or parolee should be "re-
taken or reincarcerated for a parole or probation viola-
tion," Utah Code Annotated, §§ 77-62-46 through 77-
62-49 (1973). 
The conclusion is obvious and inescapable: Appel-
lant was illegally removed from the State of Illinois, 
and is, therefore, illegally detained in the State of Utah. 
P O I N T I I 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S D E N I E D D U E 
PROCESS O F L A W I N T H A T NO H E A R I N G 
W A S A V A I L A B L E TO H I M TO C H A L L E N G E 
H I S B E I N G T A K E N I N T O CUSTODY I N IL-
L I N O I S . 
Appellant further contends that because of the 
nature of the interpretation given the Interstate Com-
pact he could not challenge the identification of the 
officer, or himself as the probationer, by any means and 
was, therefore, denied procedural safeguards and due 
process of law. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Interstate Compact, as herebefore applied, 
denies a parolee or probationer any rights in the re-
ceiving state. In allowing out-of-state warrants to be 
the sole requirement of rendition, the receiving state 
considers itself to have relinquished jurisdiction, and, 
therefore, no action can be taken. 
Thus, the Appellant was allowed no right to bring 
a writ of habeas corpus in the receiving state to test the 
validity of his retaking, nor could he have gone to the 
federal courts as they have ruled on petition for writ 
of habeas corpus that they will not interfere with state 
action until all of the state's remedies have been ex-
hausted, Application Of Hodge, 248 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 
1957), 22 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948). 
As a result, the Petitioner was denied any right to 
due process prior to his departure from Illinois, and 
received no protection from the illegal taking and ar-
bitrary rendition of his person from the State of Illinois. 
Such a blatant violation of Appellant's constitu-
tional rights is untenable in our society and therefore 
Appellant should be released from custody. 
P O I N T I I I 
A P P E L L A N T C O N T E N D S T H A T H E 
W A S U N L A W F U L L Y S U R R E N D E R E D TO 
T H E E X T R A D I T I N G O F F I C E R . 
The Appellant was a patient at the Alton State 
Hospital, a mental health facility supervised by the 
8 
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State of Illinois' Department of Mental Health and 
was "released in custody of Madison County Deputy 
for transportation to Utah." There was no statement 
made, nor documentation provided, which relates to 
the mental condition of Appellant at the time of his re-
lease by Illinois authorities. 
Illinois statutory law provides that the superinten-
dent of the hospital may release a person admitted or 
hospitalized at any time, if the patient is "no longer in 
need of hospitalization," Smith-Hurd Illinois Anno-
tated Statutes, 91l/2 Mental Health Code § 10-4 
(1969). The statute clearly mandates an examination 
of the patient, in order to determine whether or not the 
patient is or is not "in need of hospitalization." No 
such examination was conducted prior to the release 
of Appellant into the custody of the Madison County 
authorities. 
As the Illinois statute was not complied with, the 
Appellant was not afforded the right to due process of 
law, in that he was unlawfully released from the cus-
tody of the Mental Health Department without an ex-
amination as to his necessity of further hospitalization. 
Because Appellant was unlawfully released, it rea-
sons that he must have been unlawfully taken into cus-
tody and therefore he is unlawfully detained by the 
State of Utah. 
9 
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l r POINT IV 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S T W I C E S E N T -
E N C E D F O R T H E SAME CRIME. 
On June 22, 1970, before the Honorable Ronald 
O. Hyde, Appellant was sentenced to probation, hav-
ing previously pleaded guilty to the charge of issuing 
checks against insufficient funds. The terms of Peti-
tioner's probation included a 6 month sentence in the 
Weber County jail, and restitution. No alternate sent-
ence was passed, nor was a date set at which such al-
ternate sentence would or could be imposed against Ap-
pellant. 
Therefore, the sole and exclusive sentence assessed 
against the Appellant was that he pay restitution, and 
that he serve six months in the County jail. No sent-
ence, apart from that described was imposed. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-35-17 (1953), gives the 
court authority to ". . . suspend the imposition or the 
execution of sentence . . . " Appellant sentence was not 
suspended in either impositio or execution. Appellant 
was sentenced: to six months only, and placed on pro-
bation and served 3 months of the sentence and no other 
sentence was imposed. 
The Utah case law demonstrates that a sentence, 
to be instituted after termination of probation, must 
first be imposed. The proper sequence of events is that 
the defendant is sentenced, sentence is suspended, and 
xo 
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probation imposed in lieu of such sentence, William v. 
Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944); State v. 
Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 (1944); Christian-
sen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 1963 P.2d 314 (1945); State 
v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); Blaine 
V. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959); 
State v. Chestnut, 11 Utah 2d 142, 356 P.2d 36 (1960); 
State V. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 404 P.2d 677 (1965), 
Clearly, the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court 
do not support the procedure followed in Appellant's 
case. A person who has pleaded guilty to an offense 
has a right to know what his penalty for failure to suc-
cessfully perform while on probation will be. Appellant 
has a right to know with a degree of surety and cer-
tainty what his disposition will be. Appellant, in this 
case, was denied such a right. 
The subsequent sentencing of Appellant to not 
more than five years in the state penitentiary was a 
proceeding undertaken too late. His sentence had al-
ready been imposed, and such an eleventh hour attempt 
by the sentencing court was a second sentence unlaw-
fully imposed upon a crime which had been disposed 
of at an earlier date. 
P O I N T V 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S S E N T E N C E D 
U P O N A C H A R G E O F P R O B A T I O N VIOLA-
TION, W H I C H IS NOT A CRIME. 
U 
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Appellant was sentenced to a term of not more 
than five years, with credit for 6 months already served, 
for violating the terms of his probation. 
In proceedings before the Honorable John F . 
Wahlquist on June 28, 1971, Appellant was confronted 
with an affidavit which alleged that he had violated the 
terms of his probation. Appellant pleaded guilty, 
whereupon he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
As noted in Point IV, Appellant had not origin-
ally been sentenced to an alternate term. His sentence 
had been 6 months in the county jail with probation, in 
certain conditions. Appellant contends that this second 
attempt to sentence him was invalid, as sentence had 
already once been imposed and served. 
The court sentenced Appellant to a term in prison 
merely upon the strength of an affidavit alleging vio-
lation of his probation. The judgment, sentence, and 
commitment to the Utah State Prison, dated June 28, 
1971, clearly states that he was committed to the state 
prison for probation violation. 
Subsequent amended commitment orders do not 
change the obvious fact that the court wrongfully sent-
enced Appellant on the strength of an affidavit, which 
affidavit merely stood for the allegation Appellant 
had violated his probation. Even if such affidavit was 
true, the violation to which Appellant pleaded guilty 
was not a crime under any provision of the Utah Code 
12 
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Annotated, and he could not, therefore, be sentenced 
to the state prison for such violation. 
P O I N T V I 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S W R O N G L Y 
C O M M I T T E D TO T H E U T A H S T A T E P R I S -
ON ON AN I N V A L I D C O M M I T M E N T OR-
D E R . 
The rule is well settled in Utah that a court may 
correct clerical errors without formalities, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60(d). But this rule is strictly lim-
ited to clerical errors, and by its terms does not permit 
an administrative correction of a judicial error. 
As the Commitment Order dated June 28, 1971, 
demonstrates on its face, Petitioner was allegedly com-
mitted to Utah State Prison for probation violation. 
Such violation is erroneously denominated a felony 
thereupon. 
The Commitment Order demonstrates the misap-
prehension of law under which the trial court labored, 
in that the sentencing hearing was founded upon the 
violation of Appellant's probation, and that he was 
sentenced therefor. Such an error is not a mere clerical 
error, and the correction of an error other than a clerical 
error is not permitted by administrative fiat within the 
Utah Rule previously cited. 
13 
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Appellant recognizes the prerogative of the court 
to vacate, set aside, or modify its orders or judgments 
entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not ac-
curately reflect the result of its judgment, Meagher v. 
Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
However, Appellant submits that any non-clerical 
error, as was present in this case, may not and should 
not be altered, amended, or changed in any manner, 
method, or degree without the presence of the defend-
ant, and upon hearing of the cause. 
Such a change undertaken without recognized pro-
cedural safeguards invites further error. The court, act-
ing unilaterally, might recognize at a later time that 
error has been committed, error which is non-clerical 
in nature. On discovery of such error, an amended 
order might be issued, which might work to the detri-
ment of the defendant. 
The sentencing judge was evidently laboring under 
a misapprehension of law, and such misapprehension 
of law in regard to Appellant resulted in his unlawful 
imprisonment based upon an ineffective and erroneous-
ly executed Commitment Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Appellant was denied basic Constitutional 
rights in his unlawful extradition from the state of 
Illinois to the state of Utah; because he was unlaw-
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fully twice sentenced for one crime; because he was 
sentenced to prison for a "crime" which is not denom-
inated as such by the Utah Code Annotated and be-
cause he was unlawfully committed upon an invalid 
commitment order, Appellant prays that he be released 
from the custody of the defendant forthwith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P H I L L. H A N S E N 
Attorney for Appellant 
15 
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